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Pharmaceutical Markets in the German Empire. 
Profits Between Risk, Altruism and Regulation 
Axel C. Hüntelmann  
Abstract: »Pharma-Märkte im Deutschen Kaiserreich. Profite zwischen Risi-
ko, Altruismus und Regulierung«. For the first time in August 1894, phials of 
anti-diphtheria serum went on sale in German pharmacies. Anti-diphtheria se-
rum was a major therapeutic innovation in the treatment of a terrible infectious 
disease. The anti-diphtheria serum also signalled the evolution of new regula-
tory institutions, as well as new markets in industrially produced pharmaceu-
tics. The new serum therapy offered not only a cure for diphtheria and other 
fatal infectious diseases, but also promised high profits for the manufacturers 
who could stabilize the production process. It attracted the state’s attention for 
a number of reasons: the ambiguous legal situation, the production of serum 
for the free market and the prospect of high profits for the serum industry, and 
finally the novelty of serum therapy itself and the lack of information about its 
long-term effects. Drawing on concepts from economic sociology, I will argue 
that the evolving serum market was formatted by state authorities from the 
very first moment. This regulation was not imposed by “the state” but negoti-
ated among actors like state officials, medical and public health professionals, 
and serum producers. 
Keywords: pharmaceutical market, anti-diphtheria serum, public health risk, 
state regulation of pharmaceuticals. 
 
For the first time in August 1894, phials of anti-diphtheria serum produced by 
the Farbwerke vorm. Meister Lucius & Brüning in the town of Hoechst went 
on sale in German pharmacies. One month later, at the Eighth International 
Congress of Hygiene in Budapest, the scientific world was introduced to the 
new therapy against diphtheria and the serum was greeted as a great break-
through in the treatment of a terrible disease.1 The anti-diphtheria serum was a 
                                                             
  Address all communications to: Axel C. Hüntelmann, Bielefeld Graduate School in History 
and Sociology, Universitaet Bielefeld, Postfach 10 01 31, 33501 Bielefeld, Germany; e-
mail: axel@huentelmann.org. 
1  For example: Émile Roux to Émile Duclaux, Head of the Pasteur Institute, 15.9.1894, 
Museum of the Pasteur Institute, fol. 11504. A report about the congress in La semaine 
médicale, 14 (Issue 51, 8.9.1894); Le Bulletin Médical (1894), pp. 827-829, 844-845, the 
paper of Roux given on the Congress on pp. 1165-1168. For Germany see several articles 
of German newspapers in the Bundesarchiv Berlin (Federal Archive, henceforth BA Ber-
lin), R 86/1182; a report in the Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift, 20 (Issue 35-37, 
1894), pp. 700-703, 715, 729-731; detailed and with a print of several talks given in Buda-
pest in Centralblatt für Bakteriologie und Parasitenkunde, 16 (1894), pp. 737-742, 778-784, 
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major therapeutic innovation – celebrated as a milestone in bacteriology and a 
revolution in pharmacology2 – at the end of the 19th century. Representing a 
new form of therapy, the innovation of anti-diphtheria serum marks the starting 
point for many other biological therapies. The anti-diphtheria serum also sig-
nalled the evolution of new regulatory institutions, as well as new markets in 
industrially produced pharmaceutics. 
Antitoxin was the therapeutic agent contained in the anti-diphtheria serum. 
The new serum therapy offered not only a cure for diphtheria and other fatal 
infectious diseases, but also promised high profits for the manufacturers who 
could stabilize the production process and produce the serum in large industrial 
quantities. Given that there was no patent on the anti-diphtheria serum and that 
research results were freely available in prominent medical publications, a 
health professional trained in bacteriology could reconstruct the experiments 
and produce serum without breaking the law. The new serum therapy attracted 
the state’s attention for a number of reasons: the ambiguous legal situation, the 
production of serum for the free market and the prospect of high profits for the 
serum industry, the experience a few years earlier with tuberculin and the pub-
lic health scandal it had triggered, and finally the novelty of serum therapy 
itself and the lack of information about its long-term effects. Thus, in hopes of 
minimizing public health risks, the state implemented and institutionalized a 
strict regime of control.  
In his book on the Architecture of Markets, Neil Fligstein highlights the im-
portance of governments to markets by investigating the sociology of market 
processes and the socio-political embeddedness of markets.3 Public infrastruc-
ture and institutions, social structures and social relations, or the legal system 
have a major influence on the free market – if they are not the premise for 
market society – by guaranteeing the functioning of markets. In order to define 
the “terrain of a sociology of markets”, Fligstein scrutinizes the relation be-
tween state and firms in the process of the production of markets and the dy-
namics by which markets are created, stabilized and transformed.4 This per-
                                                                                                                                
822-826, 881-896, 908-914, 955-959, 960-965, 1013-1018, 1054-1058; and in the Deutsche 
Vierteljahrsschrift für öffentliche Gesundheitspflege, 27 (1895), pp. 209-276, 401-464. 
2  Cf. Hanspeter Mochmann/Werner Köhler, Meilensteine der Bakteriologie. Von Entdeckun-
gen und Entdeckern aus den Gründerjahren der Medizinischen Mikrobiologie, Jena 1984; 
Heinz Schott (ed.), Meilensteine der Medizin, Dortmund 1996; Wolf-Dieter Müller-
Jahncke/Christoph Friedrich/ Ulrich Meyer, Arzneimittelgeschichte, 2. ed., Stuttgart 2005; 
Ann S. Persson, Smallpox, Syphilis and Salvation. Medical Breakthroughs that changed the 
World, Wollombi 2009. 
3  Cf. Neil Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets. An Economic Sociology of Twentieth-
First-Century Capitalist Societies, Princeton 2001. 
4  Cf. Ibid., p. 3-23. Fligstein asks first for the social rules that must exist for markets to 
function, and the social structures that are necessary to produce stable markets (10 f.). Sec-
ondly, he investigates the “relation between states and firms in the production of markets” 
(11-13). Thirdly, he is looking for the social and – in opposition to this – the economic 
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spective is applied and discussed in the following article. With reference to 
Fligstein, I will argue that the evolving serum market was formatted by the 
state from the very first moment. Even after the serum market became stabi-
lized and the forces of supply and demand seemed to be free from direct inter-
vention like in the neo-classical market model, the market remained strictly 
regulated. This regulation was not imposed by “the state” but negotiated among 
actors like state officials, medical and public health professionals, and serum 
producers.5 
In this article, I will sketch the framework of pharmaceutical markets in the 
German Empire, and focus on the evolving market of biologicals around 1900 
(1). The years around the fin-de-siècle mark a turning point in the history of 
pharmaceuticals. After a review of the market organization of remedies up to 
the 1890s (2), I will examine why there was a need for state regulation (3) and 
how the process of regulation became stabilized and institutionalized by sum-
marizing the further course of events after the anti-diphtheria serum had been 
introduced to the public in the summer of 1894. Shortly after the launching of 
anti-diphtheria serum, a state-run institution of serum regulation had been 
established (4). Thereafter I will frame the market and distinguish the demand 
side, the supply side, and the price and the product as essential elements of the 
market (5a-c). Finally, I will look forward to subsequent developments (6) and 
embed the evolving market for ‘biologicals’ in its historical context (7). 
1. Actors of the Drug Market – (what are we talking about) 
What does a market for drugs mean? And what meanings does the term “drug” 
include? From the perspective of sick people and suffering patients we are 
talking about pain-relieving substances or life-saving remedies, from the view-
point of the practitioner we are talking about an object that gives him or her the 
power to cure ill-feeling persons. From the outlook of the practitioner, but also 
from the perspective of the apothecary and the pharmacologist drugs are scien-
tific objects, or objects of knowledge. For practitioners, apothecaries and espe-
cially for the chemical industry drugs are also economic commodities that were 
produced and sold in pharmacies, offering prospective benefits. But drugs are 
not simple commodities, they are precarious matters, difficult to handle – im-
                                                                                                                                
“view of what actors seek to do in markets” (13f.). Forthly, Fligstein takes into view the 
dynamics “by which the markets are created, attain stability, and are transformed” (14). Fi-
nally, he is asking for the “implications of market dynamics for the internal structuring of 
firms and labor markets” (14 f.). 
5  The market is understood here as an arena of social action where coordination problems 
between the different market actors were levelled out. The structure of the market as a fun-
damental precondition for the market processes is discussed in Jens Beckert, Die soziale 
Ordnung von Märkten, in: idem et al. (eds.), Märkte als soziale Strukturen, Frankfurt/Main 
2007, pp. 43-62. 
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proper use can be life-threatening – and their consumption often requires prior 
knowledge and expertise.6 
From all different perspectives, the common meaning of “drugs” or “reme-
dies” was fluid around 1900: homoeopathic substances, nutrition additives, 
cosmetics, vaccines and other biologicals like plant extracts and organ sub-
stances, over-the-counter and prescription medication.7 On the other side, the 
Pharmacopeia Germanica provided a detailed list of substances that were 
defined as “official” remedies and drugs (that were protected by the state). 
From the viewpoint of medical professionals and the medical scientific com-
munity, nostrums or secret and folk remedies were explicitly excluded from 
this officially sanctioned list of drugs (and so comprised another market alto-
gether). Insofar the meaning of drug and remedy is framing a different market 
and different market actors. In this article, I will focus on the “official” drug 
market that includes all drugs and remedies that were seen as remedies by the 
medical (scientific) community and sanctioned by the state. 
In accordance with studies on drug trajectories in the 20th century,8 we can 
identify several actors in this market: the consumer, which means the patient; 
the producer; the retailer namely (and only) apothecaries, and medical profes-
sionals. As the sale of pharmaceuticals as well as the education and apprentice-
ship of physicians and apothecaries was tightly regulated by the state, the pub-
lic health administration represents a further group of actors. Within this field 
of actors I will focus on the evolving market of biologicals and especially bac-
terio- and serum therapeuticals. 
                                                             
6  Cf. the anthology of Viola Balz/Alexander von Schwerin/Heiko Stoff/Bettina Wahrig 
(eds.), Precarious Matters/Prekäre Stoffe. The History of Dangerous and Endangered Sub-
stances in the 19th and 20th century (Preprint of the Max-Planck-Institute for the History of 
Science 356), Berlin 2008. 
7  Cf. Wolfgang Schneider, Geheimmittel und Spezialitäten. Sachwörterbuch zu ihrer Ge-
schichte bis um 1900 (Lexikon zur Arzneimittelgeschichte 4), Frankfurt/Main 1969; Elmar 
Ernst, Das “industrielle” Geheimmittel und seine Werbung. Arzneifertigwaren in der zwei-
ten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland, Würzburg 1975; Wayne Bethard, Lotions, 
Potions, and Deadly Elixirs. Frontier Medicine in America, Lanham 2004; Stuart Anderson, 
Making Medicine. A brief History of Pharmacy and Pharmaceuticals, London 2005; Erika 
Hickel, Die Arzneimittel in der Geschichte. Trost und Täuschung, Heil und Handelsware, 
Nordhausen 2008. 
8  Cf. Jean-Paul Gaudillière, Introduction. Drug Trajectories, in: Studies in the History and 
Philosophy of Biology and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2005), pp. 603-611; Jean-Paul Gaudil-
lière/Volker Hess (eds.), Ways of Regulating. Therapeutic Agents between Plants, Shops, 
and Consulting Rooms (Preprint of the Max-Planck-Institute for the History of Science 
363), Berlin 2008; see also <www.drughistories.eu>. 
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2. The Pharmaceutical Market Up to the 1890s 
The “production” of anti-diphtheria serum was innovative in two respects. 
Launching the serum onto the pharmaceutical market represented a new type of 
drug and a new therapeutic principle. Previously, the preparation of pharma-
ceuticals lay entirely in the hands of the pharmacists, making them the arbiters 
of quality control and legislation. Pharmacists – whose training and title were 
strictly regulated – mixed the preparations in their apothecaries, where drugs 
were produced only in small quantities. The Pharmacopoeia regulated only the 
degree of purity of the remedy’s ingredients. Apothecaries had to test their 
purity, harmlessness, and potency before bringing them to market, i.e. selling 
them in their pharmacies. Since the late 1880s, medications like Aspirin and 
Antipyrin were produced in large quantities in industrialized production plants 
and offered as finished products in tablet form.9 With the rising pharmaceutical 
industry, it became difficult for apothecaries to analyze the ingredients, mean-
ing that they could no longer guarantee the quality of the tablets or pills sold in 
their pharmacies. 
Quality control led to a second novelty. The serum was a living agent of 
sorts – an extract drawn from a living organism that could be of variable qual-
ity, depending on the organism that produced it. To find a universal standard, a 
serum unit had to be defined because the physicians in private practice and in 
the hospitals needed criteria for gauging serum use. Furthermore a unit of value 
was necessary to compare the potency of different sera on the pharmaceutical 
market. The so-called evaluation of serum transformed an undefined, impon-
derable effect into a quantifiable and comparable value. The evaluation of 
serum determined its “value”, indicating the impact and the potency of anti-
diphtheria serum that had been incorporated into an organism. One spoke of 
antitoxin- or immunisation units. One hundred immunisation units were de-
fined as a minimum of curative value. The process was very complicated; and 
an apothecary could barely handle it. In the mid-1890s, serum with a certain 
amount of immunisation units was mixed with an equivalent standard toxin 
(that again was fixed as the lethal dosis required to kill a guinea pig of approx. 
250-300 grams within four days). The mixture of standard toxin and serum was 
injected into a guinea pig.10 The curative value of serum was defined, when the 
guinea pig showed no reactions on its injected side or only slight reactions that 
                                                             
9  Cf. Erika Hickel, Arzneimittel-Standardisierung im 19. Jahrhundert in den Pharmakopöen 
Deutschlands, Frankreichs, Großbritanniens und der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, 
Darmstadt 1973; Wolfgang Wimmer, “Wir haben fast immer was Neues”. Gesundheitswe-
sen und Innovation der Pharma-Industrie in Deutschland, 1880-1935, Berlin 1994. 
10  Cf. Robert Koch/Emil Behring/Paul Ehrlich/Stabsarzt Dr. Weisser, Vorschläge, die Prüfung 
des Diphtherieserums und seinen Vertrieb betreffend, November 1894, BA Berlin, R 
86/1646; Richard Otto, Die staatliche Prüfung der Heilsera (Arbeiten aus dem Königlichen 
Institut für experimentelle Therapie zu Frankfurt a. M, Vol. 2), Jena 1906, pp. 39f. 
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faded away within four days.11 In practice, producers needed regulation, stan-
dardization and specialization to figure out the value of a serum. In response to 
this need, the process was institutionalized. 
3. Need for Regulation? 
From the public health administration’s point of view there were several as-
pects that justified – or rather: necessitated – a regulative intervention. As 
mentioned above, the research results on the new serum therapy were published 
in several medical periodicals. The articles were freely available and so in 
August 1894 it was in principle possible for a well-informed microbiologist to 
reconstruct the production process and to produce the serum. Moreover, there 
was neither a patent covering the production and use of serum therapy nor 
specific trademark protections. In general, in Germany the patent legislation 
applied to chemicals was adopted in 1891 for pharmaceuticals, meaning that 
only processes and not products could be protected.12 Thus anybody could copy 
the serum (as a product). One would only need to vary the production proce-
dure to skirt legal problems. Just a few years earlier in Berlin, Koch’s unsuc-
cessful treatment for tuberculosis, Tuberculin, had triggered a scandal that 
continued to rock the public health administration. In the tuberculin case, initial 
optimism had quickly turned sour, while officials watched impotently from the 
sidelines, not knowing how or whether to intervene.13 Anti-diphtheria serum 
had been obtained from the blood of animals – mainly horses. The novelty of 
serum therapy and a lack of information concerning its long-term effects, as 
well as the prospect of high profits in the serum industry prompted high-
ranking government officials into legislative action. Nevertheless, the principle 
aim was probably to minimize biopolitical risks and to avoid any scandal aris-
ing from unscrupulous firms selling ineffective or impure serum. 
                                                             
11  Cf. Ehrlich, Controle 1896. The different drafts for the test procedure in the Archive of the 
Paul Ehrlich Institute (henceforth APEI), Dept. Va, No. 1, Vol. 1. Already in 1897 the 
method of evaluation changed due to problems resulting from variances and the sinking 
poisonousness of the standard toxin. Since mid-1897, the scale basis was a dried and  
vacuum sealed standard serum, cf. Axel C. Hüntelmann, The dynamics of “Wertbestim-
mung”, in: Science in Context 21 (2008), pp. 229-252. 
12  Cf. Wimmer, Gesundheitswesen, pp. 85-101; Margrit Seckelmann, Industrialisierung, 
Internationalisierung und Patentrecht im Deutschen Reich, 1871-1914, Frankfurt/Main 
2006. 
13  Christoph Gradmann, “Ein Fehlschlag und seine Folgen. Robert Kochs Tuberkulin und die 
Gründung des Instituts für Infektionskrankheiten in Berlin 1891”, in idem/Thomas Schlich 
(eds.)., Strategien der Kausalität. Konzepte der Krankheitsverursachung im 19. und 20. 
Jahrhundert (Pfaffenweiler, 1999), pp. 29-52, in particular p. 36-38; idem, Krankheit im 
Labor. Robert Koch und die medizinische Bakteriologie, Göttingen 2005. 
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4. Institutionalisation of Regulation 
In early November 1894 a conference was organized by the Imperial Health 
Office – the highest medical authority in the German Empire – bringing to-
gether medical officials from the Prussian Ministry for Cultural Affairs, repre-
sentatives of the Federal states, the Imperial Health Office, and scientists from 
the Prussian Institute for Infectious Diseases, like Paul Ehrlich, Robert Koch, 
and Emil Behring. Later on, representatives of the pharmaceutical industry 
were also included in the discussion. The participants at this conference dis-
cussed the regulation of the new serum therapy and the need to protect the 
public against impure or ineffective serum.14 
Interestingly, one of the proposals for state regulation took the Pasteur Insti-
tute as their model, proposing an Imperial institute to produce and distribute the 
serum.15 The production of anti-diphtheria serum was financed in France by 
private donations and attended by a nation-wide public campaign. In the Ger-
man health administration, however, the idea of a state-run institute was only 
raised by government medical officials as a threat to the serum producers.16 
Furthermore, there was also a call for donations in the name of the Empress to 
found such a state-run institute for serum production,17 along with several other 
appeals, especially in the early months, for funds to pay for free serum for the 
poor.18 
Between November 1894 and February 1895 a series of meetings gave rise 
to draft legislation covering serum production, distribution and sale. In accor-
dance with an imperial decree from January 1890, the diphtheria serum could 
                                                             
14  Minutes of the meeting from 3rd and 5th of November 1894 in BA Berlin, R 86/1646. For 
background information regarding the importance of the conference see Heinz 
Zeiss/Richard Bieling, Emil von Behring. Gestalt und Werk (Berlin, 1941), pp. 153-157. 
15  Cf. the discussions on a meeting on October 19th in the Imperial Health Office, BA Berlin, 
R 86/1646; and the minutes of a meeting at the Prussian Ministry for Cultural Affairs on 
October 24th 1894, Geheimes Staatsarchiv Berlin (henceforth GStA PK), HA 1, Rep. 76 
VIII B, No. 3747; undated report from B. Fraenkel about the distribution of diphtheria se-
rum in France, ibid; see also Carola Throm, Das Diphtherieserum. Ein neues Theraphie-
prinzip, seine Entwicklung und Markteinführung, Darmstadt 1995, p. 71. 
16  Cf. Althoff an Behring, 15.11.1894, Behring-Archiv Marburg, folder 8-01: Correspondence 
Althoff, Doc. 1; the head of the Imperial Health Office, Carl Koehler, about Althoff’s idea 
in a letter to Josef von Kerschensteiner, extraordinary member of the Imperial Health Office 
and privy council in the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior, 27.11.1894, BA Berlin, R 
86/1646; plans to found a state-run institute of serum production are reported in the Ber-
liner Tageblatt, 26.2.1908. 
17  Cf. the appeal for funds in the name of the Empress for a German Institute for serum pro-
duction, BA Berlin, R 86/1646. 
18  The Kaiserin-Friedrich-Hospital in Berlin received 30,000 Marks for this cause, and a call 
for donations from the Lokal-Anzeiger in Berlin also raised some money, cf. the donation of 
30,000 Marks the letter of Rudolf Virchow to an unnamed privy council, 17.10.1894, GStA 
PK, HA 1, Rep. 76 VIII B, No. 3747. The “Appeal to all philanthropists” for funds to buy 
serum for the poor by the newspaper owner August Scherl in October 1894, ibid. 
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only be sold in pharmacies, thus ensuring that the distribution of diphtheria 
serum was limited to medical specialists. Following a Federal resolution of July 
1891, a prescription was required for the anti-diphtheria serum and the serum 
was inscribed in the Pharmacopoeia Germanica as serum antidiphthericum.19 
In the absence of empirical knowledge about the action of the serum, officials 
decided to link its introduction onto the market with the compilation of medical 
statistics to prove the effectiveness of the new therapy.20 
The most important point in the German scheme was the state control of the 
production, distribution, and the commercial exploitation of the serum. Only a 
trained expert could determine the potency of the serum, and the mass produc-
tion of the serum reinforced this state of affairs, with industrial laboratories 
rather than pharmacies becoming sites of both production and quality control.21 
The surveillance of serum production combined centralized and local ele-
ments and involved not only the monitoring of the production process, but also 
the use of a state institute for serum control. In every production plant the proc-
ess was permanently monitored by a medical officer, paid by the producer, but 
answerable to the state in the form of the Prussian Ministry for Cultural Affairs 
or the district president. In addition, the serum was tested for purity as well as 
being evaluated and certified centrally at the Serological Institute founded in 
February 1895.22 There were also strict regulations concerning the handling and 
packaging prior to distribution, and the sale price was regulated, with special 
tariffs for social insurance organizations, welfare institutions, and hospitals. 
                                                             
19  Reichsgesetzblatt 1895, p. 1. 
20  Cf. the minutes of the meeting from 3rd and 5th of November 1894 in BA Berlin, R 
86/1646. The results of the statistics were published as “Ergebnisse der Sammelforschung 
über das Diphtherieheilserum für die Zeit vom April 1895 bis März 1896” and send to 
every library in the German Empire and to several institutions, cf. BA Berlin, R 86/1646. A 
summary was published in Arbeiten aus dem Kaiserlichen Gesundheitsamt, 13 (1897), pp. 
254-292. The regulation of anti-diphtheria serum is described in detail in Axel C. 
Hüntelmann, Hygiene im Namen des Staates. Das Reichsgesundheitsamt 1876-1933, Göt-
tingen 2008, ch. 3.3. 
21  Cf. Hickel, Arzneimittel-Standardisierung; Wimmer, Gesundheitswesen. The aim of the 
control was the reduction of sources of error. With the industrialization process it was eas-
ier to control a few producers than to control thousands of pharmacies. 
22  The controlstation for diphtheria serum was first housed in the Institute for Infectious 
Diseases, headed by Robert Koch, before it became independent 1896 as Institute of Serum 
Research and Serum Testing. After the institute moved to Frankfurt on Main in 1899 it was 
renamed as Institute of experimental Therapy, for a short history see Wilhelm Kolle (ed.), 
Das Staatsinstitut für experimentelle Therapie und das Chemo-therapeutische Forschungs-
institut “Georg Speyer-Haus” in Frankfurt a. M. Ihre Geschichte, Organisation und ihre Ar-
beitsgebiete, in Arbeiten aus dem Staatsinstitut für experimentelle Therapie und dem Georg 
Speyer-Hause zu Frankfurt a. M. 16 (1926), p. 1-67; Axel C. Hüntelmann, Eigenartige 
Sonderstellung in der Welt. Das Königlich Preußische Institut für Experimentelle Therapie 
und das Georg Speyer-Haus im Deutschen Kaiserreich, in: Axel C. Hüntelmann/Michael C. 
Schneider (eds.), Jenseits von Humboldt. Wissenschaft im Staat, 1850-1990, Frank-
furt/Main 2010, pp. 189-215. 
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Finally, the producers guaranteed the recall of phials from pharmacies after two 
years or if the serum was ineffective or impure. Within a few months, the legis-
lation was implemented and the state institute for serum control established.23 
Thus, after April 1st 1895, only state-certified serum could be sold in Germany. 
5a. Framing the Market – Demanding Consumer 
The state regulation of serum production and distribution had an enormous 
impact on the serum market – or to be more precise: serum regulation consti-
tuted and regulated the serum market. The demand for (German) anti-
diphtheria serum rapidly increased,24 but identifying the consumer and distin-
guishing between patients and physicians was difficult. According to the feder-
al resolution of 1891, patients needed a medical prescription to obtain the se-
rum. As a result, the producers marketed their product to the physicians 
prescribing the remedy, not to the patient as the end-consumer. This corres-
ponds with studies on the medicalization of the patient, who was not consi-
dered as a mature end-consumer.25 Around 1900 and in the context of pharma-
ceuticals, marketing should be understood as “bringing the product to the 
market” in a neutral sense and not mixed up with propaganda. At the turn of the 
century, the chemical companies did not have had a propaganda department for 
their pharmaceutical products26 and beyond this, the promotion of medical 
                                                             
23  See the minutes of the meeting from the 17.12.1894, 17.1.1895 and 1.2.1895 and the corre-
spondence between the participants of the meetings in BA Berlin, R 86/1646; GStA PK, 
HA 1, Rep. 76 VIII B, No. 3747; about the foundation of the Serological Institute see GStA 
PK, HA 1, Rep. 76 Vc, Sekt. 1, Tit. XI, part II, No. 18, vol. 1. 
24  Evidenced by the rising turnover in serum phials, the amount of serum certified by state-run 
institutes, and company profits, cf. the turnover Throm, Diphtherieserum; the rising quanti-
tiy of serum is listed in the files of the Institute of Serum Research and Serum Testing 
GStA PK, HA 1, Rep. 76 Vc, Sekt. 1, Tit. XI, part II, No. 18, vol. 1. 
25  For the medicalization of patients see i. e. studies in the 1980s and 1990s like Claudia 
Huerkamp, Der Aufstieg der Ärzte im 19. Jahrhundert. Vom gelehrten Stand zum professi-
onellen Experten: Das Beispiel Preußens, Göttingen 1985; Francisca Loetz, Vom Kranken 
zum Patienten. “Medikalisierung” und medizinische Vergesellschaftung am Beispiel Ba-
dens 1750-1850, Stuttgart 1993; or as an overview: idem, “Medikalisierung” in Frankreich, 
Großbritannien und Deutschland, 1750-1850. Ansätze, Ergebnisse und Perspektiven der 
Forschung, in: Wolfgang E. Eckart/Robert Jütte (eds.), Das europäische Gesundheitssys-
tem. Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede in historischer Perspektive, Stuttgart 1994, pp. 
123-161. 
26  There is only little research on the history of marketing of pharmaceuticals, cf. for Britain: 
Takahiro Ueyama, Health in the marketplace. Professionalism, therapeutic desires, and 
medical commodification in late-Victorian London, Palo Alto 2010; for Germany: Jochen 
Binder, Zwischen Standesrecht und Marktwirtschaft. Ärztliche Werbung zu Beginn des 20. 
Jahrhunderts im deutsch-englischen Vergleich, Frankfurt/Main 2000. Cf. also papers of 
Frank Huisman (for the Dutch market), María Jesús Santesmass (distributing Penicillin in 
Spain) and Sergio Sismondo in Viviane Quirke/Judy Slinn (eds.), Perspectives on 20th-
century pharmaceuticals, Frankfurt/Main 2010. On the early marketing of Salvarsan: Axel 
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services and products like pharmaceuticals was considered to be immoral with-
in the German medical community.27 In consideration of these limits, anti-
diphtheria serum was introduced to market with leaflets containing information 
about the “history” and production of the serum, the evaluation and the quality 
of the serum, the indication, and the application of the remedy.28 Furthermore, 
several articles of clinicians had been published in well-known medical jour-
nals like the Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift or Berliner Klinische Wo-
chenschrift reporting on the use and effects of the serum, the side effects and 
the “best” application form, providing information to general practitioners who 
wanted to use the serum.29 
5b. Framing the Market – Supplying Producer 
The supply of anti-diphtheria serum was strictly regulated. The producer had to 
comply with several requirements and fulfil certain qualifications. To offer a 
state approved remedy, the serum manufacturer had to apply to the Prussian 
Ministry of Cultural Affairs for permission to produce serum and to pay an 
“entrance fee” to finance the state-run serum institute. Another condition was 
the producer’s acceptance of several terms and duties: the permanent control of 
the live stock by a licensed veterinary; the recruitment of a medical official 
who was monitoring the production process and paid by the producer but re-
sponsible to the state authorities; the producer had to hire bacteriologically 
trained staff; every production step had to be recorded in a journal; the produc-
tion plant was subjected to hygienic inspections; and every batch of serum was 
inspected by a centralized state-run institute. Meeting these conditions served 
to verify the producer’s reputation. The Ministry of Cultural Affairs would 
query district presidents about the company’s reputation and its pecuniary 
before organizing an inspection by the district veterinary and medical offi-
cials.30 After an initial inspection, the serum producer was re-audited at irregu-
lar intervals. 
                                                                                                                                
C. Hüntelmann, Different Modes of marketing. The branding of Salvarsan (unpublished 
conference paper, 2010). 
27  Cf. Binder, Standesrecht. 
28  See the leaflets of the Dyestuff Industries Hoechst and the company Schering in BA Berlin, 
R 86/1646; GStA PK, HA 1, Rep. 76 VIII B, No. 3747; and in APEI the files on Dyestuff 
Industries Hoechst: dept. Vd, no. 1, vol. 1; or Schering:  APEI, dept. Vd, no. 2, vol. 1. 
29  Articles were also published in The Lancet, the British Medical Journal and the Semaine 
Médicale. 
30  Cf. Otto, Staatliche Prüfung; in practice the audit of the company Schering by the council-
lors Adolf Schmidtmann (Prussia) and Adolf Dieudonné (Imperial Health Office) in GStA 
PK, HA 1, Rep. 76 VIII B, No. 3748; correspondence concerning the audit procedure by 
Louis Merck in February 1895 in BA Berlin, R 86/1182; and the correspondance with the 
state of Hamburg, the Imperial Health Office and the Prussian Ministry of Cultural Affairs 
concerning the audit of the company Ruete & Enoch in April 1895 in BA Berlin, R 
86/1646. 
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As mentioned above, early debates about serum regulation considered 
founding a state-run institute along the lines of the Pasteur Institute in Paris that 
would cover the total demand for anti-diphtheria serum. Another alternative 
involved organizing serum production like the production of small pox vac-
cines, in regional production plants under state surveillance. But this alternative 
has not even been touched upon in debates about state regulation. Apart from 
the discussions about the foundation of a central state institute, the Dyestuff 
Industries in Hoechst as well as the company Schering in Berlin had invested 
large sums of money in research and development and in the construction of a 
new Biological Department in which the serum was produced.31 In the discus-
sions about the organization and regulation of serum production it was feared 
that private companies could resist these plans or would file for damages.32 
Friedrich Althoff, head of department in the Prussian Ministry of Cultural and 
Medical Affairs, also assumed that competition between different private com-
panies might have a positive impact on serum quality. And in fact, this quality 
became the unique characteristic of the serum.33 
Another difficult point was the federal constitution of the German Empire. 
Germany was a federal state and the serum producers were spread throughout 
the entire Empire. Although the Empire was responsible for the overall legisla-
tion, it had no executive power and it depended on the collaboration with the 
federal states, especially Prussia, for the law enforcement.34 Taking into ac-
count that serum was produced in private companies and in different federal 
states (not to mention serum produced abroad), the establishment of a central 
control institute seemed to be the best solution for the public health administra-
tion. In fact, the Royal Prussian Institute for Serum Research and Serum Test-
ing became an obligatory passage point: Since April 1895 only serum, tested 
and approved by the state-run institute entered the serum market in Germany.35 
                                                             
31  The description of the Biological Department of Dyestuff Industries Hoechst in Arnold 
Eiermann, Die Einrichtung zur Darstellung des Diphtherie-Heilserums in den Höchster 
Farbwerken, in: Münchener Medicinische Wochenschrift 41 (1894), pp. 1038-1040. 
32  Cf. the minutes of the meeting from 3rd and 5th of November 1894 in BA Berlin, R 
86/1646. 
33  See bellow. 
34  Cf. Woelk, Wolfgang/Jörg Vögele, Einleitung, in: Woelk, Wolfgang/Jörg Vögele (eds.), 
Geschichte der Gesundheitspolitik in Deutschland. Von der Weimarer Republik bis in die 
Frühgeschichte der “doppelten Staatsgründung”, Berlin 2002, pp. 11-48. 
35  Or, the other way around, on the German pharmaceutical market no serum was distributed 
through pharmacies that had been not been tested and certified by the state-run serum insti-
tute. For the obligatory passage point see as a summary Bruno Latour, Reassembling the 
Social. An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theroy, Oxford 2005; for an early definition cf. 
Michel Callon, Elements of a sociology of translation. Domestication of the Scallops and 
the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay, in John Law (ed.), Power, Action and Belief: A New Soci-
ology of Knowledge? London 1986, pp. 196-233; the serum institute as an obligatory pas-
sage point in accordance to Callon and Latour in Axel C. Hüntelmann, Ways of Evaluation. 
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The organisation of serum control had wide-ranging consequences for the 
producers. First, only serum producers complying with the strict professional, 
hygienic standards were allowed to produce and sell sera. For foreign serum 
producers it was very difficult to apply for a permission to sell serum in Ger-
many,36 and as a matter of fact they were excluded from the German market. 
Furthermore, due to the high “entrance fee” and the standards, small companies 
were likewise excluded. Smaller start-up companies tried to offer serum, but 
after a short while they gave up.37 In contrast, the bigger industrial chemical 
companies built up Biological Departments like the Dyestuff Industries in 
Hoechst, Schering in Berlin, or E. Merck in Darmstadt.38 The bigger compa-
nies, being in close contact to state and municipal authorities, were also in-
volved in the establishment of the state regulation of the serum market. Espe-
cially Dyestuff Industries in Hoechst remained in good standing with officials 
in the Prussian Ministry of Cultural Affairs. The chemical companies had not 
only easy access to state authorities and due to their contacts a request for their 
reputation was obsolete. Moreover, they were in a position to negotiate the 
modalities of payment of the “entrance fee” while it was difficult for small 
companies to raise the money.39 So the entrance fee was just more than a con-
tribution to fund the state-run serum institute. It was also a barrier for newcom-
ers to enter the serum market.  
In the same way, high quality standards prevented newcomers from compet-
ing on the market. The standards set in the Pharmacopeia Germanica were 
criticised by other chemical companies in the 1880s as an obstacle to exclude 
competitors. They were mainly initiated by J. Holtz, director of Schering who 
was nominated as an expert for the permanent drug board of the Imperial 
Health Office that fixed the standards. At the time, Schering was for several 
remedies the only company that was able to produce the chemicals at the fixed 
                                                                                                                                
Therapeutic Agents between Standardization and Institutionalization, in: Gaudillière/Hess 
(eds.), Ways of Regulating, pp. 65-76. 
36  Cf. the complicated correspondence with the Swiss company Haefliger & Cie. in Bern that 
was kept via the Swiss-German embassy and the Foreign Ministry in APEI, dept. Vd, no. 5, 
vol. 1 and BA Berlin, R 86/1646. At the end, the company lost interest in the German mar-
ket. 
37  Cf. the company Müller & Pröscher in Hoechst, who produced anti-diphtheria serum 
around 1901/1902. When they received the notification to pay the “entrance fee”, Proescher 
left the company, probably because of the financial burden, cf. APEI, dept. Vd, no. 6, vol. 
1. 
38  Axel C. Hüntelmann, Two Cultures of Regulation. The Production and State Control of 
Diphtheria serum at the End of the Nineteenth Century in France and Germany, Hygiea In-
ternationalis 6 (2007), no. 2, pp. 99-119; see also the company festschrift of Dyestuff Indus-
tries Hoechst of 1913. 
39  In my opinion, we have to assess the state-request for the financial situation of the compa-
nies in this context. 
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high grade of purity.40 Purity and quality also gave producers who were able to 
enter the market a competitive edge. Even though it was possible for a life 
scientist trained in bacteriological techniques to produce serum, it was difficult 
to satisfy the required high quality and purity, the fixed minimum of immuniza-
tion units, and comply with regulations. The tacit knowledge of their staff 
members and scientists, attained over several years, gave the dominating com-
panies a head start that was difficult to catch up.41 Established firms knew how 
to breed the best bacteria cultures, how to filter the strongest toxins, how to 
decrease the period of intoxication and immunisation, and how to increase the 
amount of immunisation units per blood-letting – that made the serum more 
valuable.42 To comply with regulations, firms needed to invest into ad-
ministrative techniques and organizational knowledge. These brought with 
them increased overhead costs, which in turn could be covered more easily by 
bigger companies. 
5c. Framing the Market – Product and Price 
Besides the producer and the consumer, the institutionalized regulation of 
serum influenced both the product itself and its price. Ultimately, the pricing of 
anti-diphtheria serum was anything but market driven. Life-saving pharmaceu-
ticals like anti-diphtheria serum had a relatively inelastic price as ill persons – 
the consumers – depended on it. The prospect of high profits derived from the 
serum’s inelastic price was the main reason that public health authorities fixed 
a maximum price for the serum. Even the discount rates for hospitals and social 
welfare institutions were fixed. On the other hand, the cost structure was nearly 
the same in all production plants, determined by expenses for horses, food, 
maintenance, staff and testing fees. Furthermore, the packaging and product 
design were also regulated by the state.43 As Prussian officials intended, market 
advantages could be derived only by improving the product. 
The most effective means of thwarting competitors was the enhancement of 
the se-rum’s potency. The increasing effectiveness of the serum had several 
effects and advantages for the serum producer. First, the producer could distin-
guish himself from competitors by highlighting the quality of his serum – guar-
                                                             
40  The relation between lobbying and quality standards is mentioned in Erika Hickel, Das 
Kaiserliche Gesundheitsamt und die chemische Industrie im Zweiten Kaiserreich (1871-
1914): Partner oder Kontrahenten? In: Mann, Gunter/Rolf Winau (eds.), Medizin, Natur-
wissenschaft, Technik und das Zweite Kaiserreich, Göttingen 1977, pp. 64-86; and in the 
context of the 5th Pharmacopeia in 1910 Jürgen Holsten, Das Kaiserliche Gesundheitsamt 
und die Pharmazie. Dargestellt an der Entstehung des Deutschen Arzneibuches, fünfte Aus-
gabe, Diss. med., Free University, Berlin 1977. 
41  Cf. Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, London 1966. 
42  In a double sense: serum with a higher value of immunisation units was sold for a higher 
price because the price is determined by the immunisation units. 
43  Cf. Throm, Diphtherieserum. 
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anteed and certified by the state-run serum instituted. State approved serum 
was treated like a trademark and seen as a “guarantee” of high quality. Abroad, 
German serum and the German system of serum approval became synonymous 
for high quality. In Germany it was more difficult to distinguish one’s own 
serum from the products of competitors. 
I will demonstrate the importance of quality as a distinctive feature by using 
the example of veterinary serum. While the state approval of human serum was 
mandatory, the evaluation of veterinary serum was voluntary. The market for 
veterinary sera was more diverse, as besides the big chemical companies agri-
cultural cooperatives also started to produce veterinary sera. Furthermore, the 
quality standards were less strict due to fact that only animals were affected. 
Nevertheless, some serum producers – for instance Dyestuff Industries Hoechst 
– proposed mandatory serum testing for some veterinary sera – despite the 
higher expenses. The argument of the companies proposing mandatory testing 
was that high quality standards had to be maintained. As mentioned, serum 
testing was used as a means to exclude newcomers from the market. When the 
course was set for the approval of veterinary sera to become mandatory around 
1910, the market impact of rising quality standards, “entrance fees”, and the 
regular testing fees became a topic of considerable dispute.44 
The state-tested quality of veterinary serum had a further economic implica-
tion. Before the mandatory test of red murrain sera had been established, pro-
ducers of this serum (a remedy against an animal disease with a high mortality 
rate that effected livestock, especially pigs) offered compensation for any ani-
mal that died after or despite a preventive immunization. This was done to 
strengthen confidence in red murrain serum and its use. But after several years, 
when the method and value of immunization against red murrain was allegedly 
“undoubtedly clear” and “safe” and the “impeccable quality” of the state-
approved serum seemed guaranteed, the compensation promise was taken 
back.45 The state’s seal of approval – which of course rested on negotiated 
standards and scientific expertise which is necessarily limited – made the prod-
uct immune against criticism, as it implied that the death of an animal must 
have been caused by local or individual factors, but not by the ineffectiveness 
of the serum. 
A high number of immunization units of a certain serum was regarded as the 
most important sign for high quality. The link between high quality and immu-
nization unit resulted from the fact that the probability that the human body 
showed an allergic reaction against the animal protein content of the serum 
(albumin) increased with the amount of serum being injected. The more effec-
tive the serum was, the lesser the quantity that had to be injected. The subcuta-
                                                             
44  Cf. files for red murrain serum in APEI, dept. IX, no. 1, vol. 1. 
45  Cf. the announcement of the Farbwerke Hoechst in December 1908, APEI, dept. IX, no. 1, 
vol. 1. 
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neous injection of five centilitres causes less pain or at least discomfort than ten 
centilitres. A lower quantity of serum also reduced the probability of idiosyn-
cratic reactions, for instance emphysema. Overall, using less serum was better 
for the patient, it aided advertising – and also helped the producer. 
Increasing the potency of the serum also reduced the testing fees for the 
producer. As mentioned, a sample of each batch of anti-diphtheria serum pro-
duced was sent to the institute for serum testing. As the institute charged the 
producer according to the serum batch and the amount of serum produced, 
companies could reduce the fees and cut costs by producing less, but more 
effective serum. Rarely were reduced costs passed on to the consumer as price 
cuts, and so producers reaped the savings as additional profits. Finally, serum 
producers improved the packaging, for instance the company Merck used rub-
ber plugs instead of cork to seal the phials. Naturally, such improvements – 
once introduced onto the market – became obligatory for all producers.46 Such 
strategies indicate that quality was the main battleground on which producers 
competed for market share. 
Investing into the quality of remedies was all the more important as an eco-
nomic strategy as other ways of marketing biologicals was a delicate undertak-
ing. Critics of the new serum therapy (especially members of anti-vaccination 
campaigns) as well as medical professionals expressed their discontent with the 
marketing and branding of pharmaceuticals. Generally, advertisements of 
pharmaceuticals in newspapers were frowned upon by orthodox medicine and 
press campaigns were judged to be dubious and in violation of altruistic and 
ethical norms.47 Critics decried the nexus between science and economics. Paul 
Ehrlich for instance, who was involved in the development of anti-diphtheria 
serum and contracted to the Dyestuff Industries Hoechst, had to cancel all 
current contracts with the chemical industry before he could become director of 
the new Serological Institute.48 Hence, “serious” marketing for the chemical 
industry involved publishing scientific articles in professional medical journals 
about clinical trials, product improvements, or technical and institutional 
changes.49 
                                                             
46  Cf. the correspondence with the company Merck and the Imperial Health Office and, after 
the installation of rubber plugs had been proved successful, the circular of the Imperial 
Health Office and the decree that prescribed the use of rubber plugs for phials in BA Berlin, 
R 86/1646. 
47  While German health professionals were very dubious about marketing and the promotion 
of remedies, this was different in Great Britain and the US. Cf. for the official proscription 
of medical advertisements (and the efforts to occur this ban) Binder, Standesrecht. 
48  Cf. Axel C. Hüntelmann, Paul Ehrlich 1854-1915. Leben, Forschung, Ökonomien, Netz-
werke, Göttingen 2011, pp. 102-110. 
49  Cf. Hüntelmann, Branding Salvarsan. 
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6. Future Prospects 
Anti-diphtheria serum was one of several remedies produced in an industrial 
style that were opening a new marketplace. Indeed, anti-diphtheria serum was a 
landmark in the evolving market of biologicals. The systematic development of 
anti-diphtheria serum – test series in vitro and in vivo, clinical trials, the moni-
toring of the practical use of serum – became a blueprint for the research and 
development of further pharmaceuticals. Despite all the restrictions and price 
regulations, the evolving chemical and pharmaceutical industry earned huge 
profits by producing anti-diphtheria and other serum: the construction costs for 
the production plant of the Biological Department of the Dyestuff Industries in 
Hoechst, built during 1894, had already been amortized by the end of that year 
and within the following twelve months the department had made a profit of 
707,000 Marks.50 After the anti-diphtheria serum was introduced to the market, 
several other sera, vaccines and biological diagnostics like tuberculin fol-
lowed.51 All human vaccines and sera were either produced in state-run insti-
tutes52 or were centrally controlled by the serum institute.53 Admittedly, other 
veterinary sera were sold on the free market, but several sera were also placed 
under voluntary (and later mandatory) state control. Furthermore, in the 1920s, 
chemotherapeutics like Salvarsan were centrally tested in accordance to the 
model of serum control in state-run institutes. The formation of the market for 
anti-diphtheria serum was not a one-off phenomenon – it was a blueprint for 
prospective pharmaceuticals. 
7. Evolving the Market Field 
The formation of the marketplace for biologicals was embedded in social, 
economic, political, and scientific frameworks.54 The market depended on 
biopower and indirect government, capitalism and free market system, the 
federal constitution of the German Empire, the scientific developments in bac-
teriology and the pharmaceutical industry, and past experiences with the tuber-
culin scandal. 
Given the complexity of this marketplace, we must take the aims and mo-
tives of different actors into account: in an existential situation, the consumer 
                                                             
50  Laubenheimer pointed out that the building costs for the production plant of 444,000 Marks 
were written off with the profit of the first year, cf. Laubenheimer, Geschichte, p. 10; 
Throm, Diphterieserum, table. 
51  Cf. Otto, Staatliche Prüfung, and later editions. 
52  Rabies and typhoid vaccines were produced in the Institute for Infectious Diseases in 
Berlin, small pox vaccines were produced in regional institutes. 
53  Along the lines of the German model, several other state-run institutes had been established 
abroad. 
54  Cf. Fligstein, Architecture; Beckert, Ordnung, p. 45. 
 198 
(patients and physician alike) sought a remedy for a severe disease. The pro-
ducer wanted to make a profit – not at any price, but recognizing that an effec-
tive remedy is its best promotion and that an ineffective or harmful remedy 
might ruin the company. The state had a fundamental interest in combating 
infectious diseases for biopolitical reasons and to demonstrate his capacity to 
act. The state therefore insisted upon pure and effective anti-diphtheria serum 
in the required quantities. Supplying people with anti-diphtheria serum was a 
major public health issue and the state had both to ensure the supply of anti-
diphtheria serum and to minimize any related public health risks, because no 
one had many experiences in dealing with biologicals. 
Due to the cooperation between the Empire, industry, and the federal states 
there was an indirect type of governance. In the German Empire, the serum was 
produced by private pharmaceutical companies, but the state regulated the price 
and exercised control over the production process to ensure a pure and effective 
serum. Nevertheless, the system of quality control was not imposed by the 
state: it was worked out in cooperation with scientists, state-run institutes, the 
federal states, and the pharmaceutical industry.55 
By regulating the biopolitical objects to combat infectious diseases with 
pharmaceuticals, the state had to consider the federal constitution and eco-
nomic order of a free market system. The development of serum therapy coin-
cides with the formation of a pharmaceutical industry (or better put: its diver-
gence from the chemical industry) that from the outset invested huge sums of 
money in serum therapy. Nevertheless, after anti-diphtheria serum came onto 
market, the state took over an indirect control. Central government and the 
federal states had to cooperate with the industry to guarantee the success of the 
control measures and it was certainly in the companies’ own interest to cooper-
ate with the state. Thus, we can say that the control exercised by the serological 
institute was necessary to supervise serum production throughout the empire. 
The state-run serological institute became an obligatory passage point for the 
anti-diphtheria serum that was sold on the German pharmaceutical market. 
Overall, regulation of the anti-diphtheria serum (and other sera) and the imple-
mentation of a state-run institute for quality control can also be interpreted in 
                                                             
55  Cf. for the triangle of state, science, industry in the German Empire for instance Margit 
Szöllösi-Janze, Der Wissenschaftler als Experte. Kooperationsverhältnisse von Staat, Mili-
tär, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft, 1914-1933, in: Doris Kaufmann (ed.), Geschichte der 
Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft im Nationalsozialismus. Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektiven 
der Forschung, Göttingen 2000, pp. 50-58; idem, Die institutionelle Umgestaltung der Wis-
senschaftslandschaft im Übergang vom späten Kaiserreich zur Weimarer Republik, in: Rü-
diger vom Bruch/Brigitte Kaderas (eds.), Wissenschaften und Wissenschaftspolitik. Be-
standsaufnahmen zu Formationen, Brüchen und Kontinuitäten im Deutschland des 20. 
Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart 2002, pp. 60-74; idem, Wissensgesellschaft in Deutschland. Überle-
gungen zur Neubestimmung der deutschen Zeitgeschichte über Verwissenschaftlichungs-
prozesse, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 30 (2004) pp. 277-313. 
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terms of a technology of trust.56 For the companies, the “state approved” stamp 
affected their marketing, guaranteeing a high quality product and effectively 
functioning like a trademark. Finally, the early state regulation of biologicals 
like serum and vaccines framed the entire serum market, and indeed constituted 
and framed the market as such, as it structured the product as well as the pro-
ducer, the distribution of the serum and the consumer. Nevertheless, within the 
architecture of the market, the trade of serum was free and the different serum 
producers had to compete with each other. The mode of indirect government 
took into account the liberal capitalistic market order and made possible the 
free play of the forces of supply and demand. 
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